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The rise and fall 
of the first global real
estate bubble
The key factor to create the first real estate bubble was the
existence of great liquidity at global scale between 2001 and
2005. In some countries, this period lasted till August 2007.
Liquidity was generated by historically very low interest rates and
virtually unbeatable financing conditions. Between 2006 and
2008, the different real estate bubbles burst. This was the
consequence of the combination of two phenomena: a sudden
change in mortgage financing conditions due to worldwide
expansion of the US subprime mortgage crisis, and a large excess
offer in housing in some countries.
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Introduction
The evolution of the residential market has histori-
cally been a secondary subject, only followed 
basically by real estate professionals and those
thinking of buying or selling a housing property
in the near future. International investment was
scarce and there were virtually no indices compar-
ing housing price increases in different countries.
However, the economic situation in the residential
market has become a subject of great macro -
economic relevance after 2000. The rise of the
first global real estate bubble between 2001 and
2005 was to blame for it. After 2006, the reason
was its burst, first in the United States, then in
Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom, before
eventually reaching Eastern Europe. In many
countries, investment in building has evolved
from a key driver of economic growth to a mere
relict within a few years.
The creation of the first real estate bubble was
mainly driven by great liquidity at global scale
between 2001 and 2005. In some countries, this
period lasted till August 2007. This liquidity was
generated by historically very low interest rates
and virtually unbeatable financing conditions
offered by banks to families and companies. This
liquidity created unheard phenomena such as
the simultaneous rise of riskier assets (stock and
housing) as well as those traditionally considered
a haven (bonds and gold). So in 2005, the world
economy featured a really paradoxical combination:
considerable increase of stock quotations (except
in the US), strong rise of housing prices, high
market value of government bonds of developed
countries and gold price at its maximum level of
the previous twenty years. That year, almost all
assets increased their value or maintained it at an
extraordinarily high level.
Between 2006 and 2008, the different real estate
bubbles created in the previous period burst. This
was caused by the combination of two phenomena:
a sudden change in mortgage financing condi-
tions, and considerable excess housing offer in
some countries. Worldwide expansion of the US
subprime mortgage crisis challenged the solvency
of some banks and triggered considerable 
liquidity constraints.
In some countries such as Spain, the
United Kingdom and Ireland, the
bubble would have burst even without
the financial crisis in the United
States.
After August 2007, lower credit availability
reduced considerably demand in housing,
which was already in clear decline, leading to
considerable agreements on prices and transac-
tions in a large number of countries.
Nevertheless, in some countries such as Spain,
the United Kingdom and Ireland, the bubble
would have burst even without the financial 
crisis in the United States. The main reason 
was considerable excess in offer, a point that was
clearly visible in early 2007. If the subprime
mortgage crisis had not occurred, the bubble
would probably have taken longer to burst and
its negative effects would have been less intense
and more spread over time.
I will divide the present article into three sections.
In the first, I will analyse the main reasons that
led to a global real estate bubble between 2001
and 2005. In the second, I will explain how the
bubble burst and some features this burst has
had in some countries. Finally, in the third section
I will point out measures to be implemented
at international level to find a way out of the
current economic crisis.
The creation of the first
global real estate bubble
(2001-05)
During the first years of this decade, housing
adopted a new role: that of a haven asset. This
function was shared with other assets such as
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bonds or gold. This situation was largely the
effect of the negative development of the main
stock markets of the world between March
2000 and 2003. During this period, events 
of different sort like the burst of the speculative
dotcom bubble, 9/11, different corporate scandals
(Enron, Worldcom, etc.) and the possible effects
of the war against Iraq increased substantially
the risk of stock investment and reduced con-
siderably expected profitability.
For this reason, capital moved to safer assets
offering a better profitability-risk ratio. This
move, especially after September 2001, triggered
a substantial increase in housing demand for
investment and contributed decisively to cause
a considerable price increase of housing in
many countries.
In 2001, direct and indirect repercussions of the
poverty effect, caused by a decline in stock
exchange quotations, led to a global economic
recession that had not been observed in such
terms since 1982. Since 1975, the three main
economies (USA, Japan and Germany) had not
fallen into stagnation at the same time. This
adverse situation caused the main central banks
to fear the disastrous combination of recession
and deflation. This is what had occurred in
Japan after the burst of the speculation bubble
created in the second half of the 1980s. In order to
prevent this combination, and after considering
the mistakes done by the Bank of Japan in the
1990s, the Federal Reserve and the European
Central Bank decided a rapid and considerable
reduction of nominal interest rates (cf. Graph 1).
This reduction was so strong that real interest
rates became negative in some countries like
Spain and the United States.
Such an expansive monetary policy – especially
in the US, where the reduction of interest rates
was bigger – was basically aimed at giving
incentives to families to increase their leveraging
as well as housing demand. If this target was
met, the sales increase in the residential market
would lead to an increase in building investment,
considerable job creation and more dynamism
in expenditure of families. Thus the positive
evolution of private consumption and invest-
ment in building prevented recession and
deflation from coming together. In some coun-
tries such as the United States and Spain, these
variables not only managed to prevent a crisis
but also became the key drivers of a period of
high economic growth.
Housing assets as a haven, reduced
interest rates, high liquidity 
and investors’ preference for
residential market assets created a
global real estate bubble in 2001-2005.
As opposed to earlier periods, the new capital
flows reaching the real estate sector in the inter-
national market did not target the purchase of
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Graph 1. Nominal interest rate variation
Source: European Central Bank
The Federal Reserve and the European Central
Bank decided a rapid and considerable reduction
of nominal interest rates in the 1990s.
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office buildings and hotels but rather residential
buildings instead. The economic recession created
by the burst of the speculation bubble meant
increasing vacancy rates in office buildings
mainly due to bankruptcy of many companies
related to the new economy.
These vacancy rates reduced profitability
expectations, increased the risk of investing in
such assets and rendered commercial use
of such properties less attractive. In the case of
hotels, their  profitability went down due to
reduced  economic activity, especially in the
United States, following the decline of tourism.
However, the market value of hotels and office
buildings located in the city centres increased
substantially. The explanation of this seeming
paradox has to do with their possible conversion
into residential buildings and their appraisal
as such. Low interest rates, together with
scarce attraction by alternative assets, caused a
great increase in demand of investment in 
 luxury housing located in the prime areas of the
most important cities of the world. Given the
scarce offer, many developers decided to
 purchase office buildings and hotels at prices
unthinkable of just some years earlier. The
sums paid were in no case justified by income
from rent (office buildings) or operating results
(hotels).
The aim of such purchases was conversion into
flat buildings and separate sale of each
dwelling to cater for insatiable demand out of
investment purposes. Given the lack of alter-
natives and the great financing capacity avail-
able, demand was rather driven by the location
and symbolic character of the building than its
real value. This fact contributed decisively to a
spectacular housing price increase in the centre
of the main cities (except in Germany and Japan)
that was generally higher than in surrounding
areas.
To summarise, housing assets as a haven,
reduced interest rates, high liquidity and
investors’ preference for residential market
assets created a global real estate bubble in
2001-2005. Its scope and size can be perfectly
observed on Charts 2 and 3.
Despite the problems observed in the interna-
tional economy during the 2001-2003 period,
housing prices increased significantly in all
analysed countries except Germany and Japan.
In some countries, such as Spain, the United
Kingdom and Ireland, the price increase was
partially supported by according economic
development. However, it was much more
related with financial rather than macroeco-
nomic aspects in other countries. This is
the case of France and Italy. Although their
economic growth was rather low, housing
prices increased on average an 11.9% and
9.1% respectively during the analysed five-year
period.
The burst of the bubble:
different cases
Real estate bubbles usually burst for two reasons:
worse conditions for mortgage financing and
excess housing offer. The first usually takes
place when the central bank believes that there
are serious possibilities that the inflation rate
on goods and services grows considerably in
the next months, eventually reaching too high
levels. To prevent such increase, it acts swiftly
by raising the guiding rate considerably within
a short time. On certain occasions, such action
is a crass error and has worse effects (joint
deflation and recession) than those created by a
relatively high, though occasional inflation rate.
A good example for this is Japan. Fears of
increasing inflation led the central bank to raise
the guiding interest rate from 2.5% to 6%
between May 1989 and August 1990. A few
months later, the real estate bubble that had
started in 1987 burst. The Bank of Japan made
three major errors in this period: it did not take
enough into account the evolution of asset
prices, thus contributing decisively to the
growth of a stock and real estate bubble; it
increased the guiding interest rate too fast
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when inflation on goods and services started
rising; and it took too long to change the trend
of its monetary policy when both bubbles burst.
The considerable interest rate increase caused
an important reduction in the three main
demand categories: use, asset and speculative
investment. In the first case, the increase of
mortgage instalments turns a portion of a
demand from solvent to insolvent, pushing one
part to rents and withdrawing the other. In the
second, it means that profitability earned
through renting out the asset is often below the
leveraging cost, thus rendering the purchase of
the property hardly attractive. And in the third
case, it increases the cost of speculative activity
and the risk of any operation. Faced with this
new state of mind, a significant number of
speculators withdraws from the market.
Big excess in offer seems to be caused by a con-
siderable increase in the number of dwellings
built. The first factor determines the rise of
interest rates and deterioration of economic
perspectives. The second occurs as a conse-
quence of high benefits earned in the past by
developers, which induces them to increase the
pace at which they purchase land and to plan
to build a higher number of new dwellings.
Their expectation is that profitability earned
with previous developments will be equalled or
even surpassed by future ones.
These companies very often are not aware in
time of adverse change in the economic situa-
tion nor of its negative effects on the residential
market. So if the economy does well, they
almost always think the current real estate hype
will go on for at least some more years when
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Graph 2. Accumulated variation of housing
prices in major countries, 2001-05
Source: The Economist and own
Housing assets as a haven created a real estate
bubble.
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Graph 3. Average annual variation of
housing prices in major countries, 2001-05
Source: The Economist and own
Housing prices grew everywhere except in
Germany and Japan.
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planning new developments. On numerous
occasions, reality catches them by surprise and
they observe how in a new economic situation,
a significant part of dwellings are not sold after
completing a new building. Excessive leverage
leads sooner or later to the need of eliminating
or considerably reducing the current stock,
causing a dramatic price fall that contributes
decisively to the burst of the bubble.
In the last two years, the burst of real
estate bubbles having occurred in
different countries had one common
feature: the global financial crisis
generated indirectly by the real estate
recession affecting the United States
since the second half of 2006.
An example of what we are explaining could be
seen over the last years in the Spanish residential
market. During the second half of 2006, the selling
pace went down in many cities, while housing
prices were still increasing. Some developers did
not notice this reduction and others simply
denied it. The outcome was that in that year,
920,199 new housing units were planned, an all-
time record. The number of new dwelling units to
be sold (including those in the hands of speculators)
is above a million right now.
In the last two years, the burst of real estate
bubbles having occurred in different countries
had one common feature: the global financial
crisis generated indirectly by the real estate
recession affecting the United States since the
second half of 2006. This crisis has affected 
considerably the capacity of raising credit for
housing demanders, reduced transactions 
significantly and triggered important price falls
in many countries.
The negative effects on banks could have been
avoided, or at least mitigated, if the Federal
Reserve and the US Department of the Treasury
had taken existing links between the real estate
market and the finance sector into more con-
sideration. If they had done so, they probably
would have used other incentives apart from
lowering the guiding interest rate (such as par-
tial surety for newly given credits, additional tax
exemptions, etc.) to avoid a continuous fall of
housing transactions and prices. If they had
succeeded, they would have stabilised the
 residential market and implicitly set a relatively
high minimum price for bonds linked to
subprime mortgages in the fixed-interest 
market. Thus bank losses due to the decline of
the value of their assets would have been
smaller and their deterioration could have been
prevented.
For this reason, their total needs of new own
funds would have been easily quantifiable
instead of being a complete uncertainty. If it
had been done this way, doubts on present
 solvency of many banks all over the world
would probably not exist.
In most Eastern European countries, the burst
of the bubble has been the result of quick with-
drawal of foreign real estate investors, apart
from the effects caused by the international
financial crisis. In the final stage of the bullish
period, a large number of speculators from
many countries thought that the real estate El
Dorado was located in Eastern Europe. For this
reason, they bought countless property and a
huge number of housing units at unheard
prices for developers and families living there.
Speculators went there attracted mainly by four
factors: the perspective of continuously high
economic growth, the expectation of relatively
quick integration in the eurozone, relatively low
real estate and property prices compared to
most Western countries and abundant liquidity.
The first was based on the perception of EU
structural and cohesion funds, company
 offshoring to these countries and the imple-
mentation of economic liberalisation policies.
The second implied expectations of a significant
risk decrease as a hardly reputed currency
would be replaced quite quickly by one with
great international pedigree (the euro). The
third meant progressive homogenisation of
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housing prices between Eastern and Western
Europe and thus expectations of higher value
increase in Eastern European countries. Finally,
the fourth made it relatively easy to raise credit
under good conditions from a bank in a devel-
oped country to purchase property abroad.
Initially, most investors thought of selling
 purchased or built housing to the local population.
However, high prices and purchasing pressure
from second, third and fourth-generation
 speculators had that property bought mainly by
foreigners. The demand, which had been almost
inexhaustible up to August 2007, collapsed when
the financial crisis became global. The excess
offer is impressive right now, transactions are
almost non-existent and prices are plummeting.
Nevertheless, almost nothing of all this is certi-
fied by real estate statistics, which are hardly
rigorous anyway.
Solutions
During the period stretching from 2004 to Sep-
tember 2008, global economic policy management
was extremely deficient and the main cause for
the present crisis. 
Countless mistakes were made, but the biggest
were keeping an extraordinarily low guiding
interest rate in the US over a too long period;
underestimation by American authorities of
existing links between the residential market
and the finance sector; the belief that it was
reduced liquidity what was causing solvency
problems of some banks, when the exact
 contrary was the case; confusion between a
demand and an offer crisis (ECB); and an
erratic policy of bank rescues (why did not the
Federal Reserve save Lehman Brothers?).
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The burst of real estate bubbles had one common feature: the global financial crisis generated by the
real estate recession affecting the United States.
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The main problem in the world economy was
duly identified towards the end of 2008: existence
of an international financial crisis. In this respect,
most measures taken are adequate. From my point
of view, the roadmap towards recovery should
initially look for stabilisation of residential mar-
kets of the world’s leading countries to ultimately
quantify losses suffered by banks from asset dete-
rioration in an adequate manner. Then, public
capital should enter banks with the aim of
increasing own funds and offering fast and
appropriate liquidity for families and businesses.
To make up for the loss in demand of goods from
the private industry, public authorities should go
on implementing a very expansive tax policy till
the end of 2010 in order to prevent further
deterio ration of the economic situation.
The roadmap towards recovery should
initially look for stabilisation of
residential markets of the world’s
leading countries to ultimately
quantify losses suffered by banks from
asset deterioration in an adequate
manner.
Finally, in some countries like Spain, where the
GDP increase depends heavily on the develop-
ment of the building industry, a set of structural
reforms (corporate tax reduction, collective
agreements at company level, etc.) should be
tackled to allow the implementation of a new
economic growth model.
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